‘I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant’: Eastern European migrants’ responses to hate crime in a semi-rural context in the wake of Brexit by Lumsden, Karen et al.
‘I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an 
immigrant’: Eastern European migrants’ responses to hate 
crime in a semi-rural context in the wake of Brexit
LUMSDEN, Karen, GOODE, Jackie and BLACK, Alex <http://orcid.org/0000-
0002-5910-0108>
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/23385/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
LUMSDEN, Karen, GOODE, Jackie and BLACK, Alex (2018). ‘I will not be thrown 
out of the country because I’m an immigrant’: Eastern European migrants’ responses 
to hate crime in a semi-rural context in the wake of Brexit. Sociological Research 
Online. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
 1 
‘I Will Not Be Thrown Out of the Country Because I’m an Immigrant’: Eastern European 
Migrants’ Responses to Hate Crime in a Semi-Rural Context in the Wake of Brexit 
 
Abstract 
This article examines Eastern European migrants’ experiences of and responses to hate crime. 
Following the UK European Union Membership Referendum (‘Brexit’ vote) there was an 
increase in reported hate crimes against immigrants. The study focuses on the experiences of 
migrants in Lincolnshire, a region of England which has a significant migrant population, and 
which had one of the highest ‘leave’ votes. The focus on white migrants in this semi-rural setting 
offers an original perspective in the field of hate crime studies. We draw on semi-structured 
interviews and observations to identify temporal, spatial and relational factors in responses to 
hate crime. We uncover the insecure occupation of a ‘third space’ constituted by material, 
discursive and emotional practices. This positioning was destabilised post-referendum; but there 
was also evidence of the operation of agency within processes of ‘othering’, suggesting a 
transition from victim identity to emergent political subject. 
 
Keywords: Brexit, hate crime, migrant, othering, political subject, racism, resistance, third 
space, victim 
 
Introduction 
This article focuses on migrants’ experiences of, and responses to, hate crime in Lincolnshire, a 
region in the East Midlands of England which has a significant migrant population and which 
had one of the highest ‘leave’ votes in the EU referendum (‘Brexit’). The focus on white 
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migrants in this setting offers an original perspective in the field of hate crime studies shedding 
light on experiences of semi-rural racism, hate crime, and victimization which have tended to 
remain ‘hidden’ (Charaborti, Garland and Spalek, 2004). The article addresses a lack of 
familiarity with victims’ experiences of hate crime (Chakraborti, 2016) by exploring the impact 
of these experiences on migrants’ use of (and access to) public spaces. By uncovering the 
temporal, spatial, relational and emotional factors at work in processes of identification, we 
reveal both the insecure occupation of a ‘third space’ (Bhabra, 1994) and the operation of agency 
which suggests that this space may represent a transitional position between victim identity and 
political subject. 
 
Lincolnshire recorded the highest ‘leave’ vote in the UK in the EU referendum at 75.6 percent of 
the total vote (Tammes, 2017). A large migrant population is employed in factories and the 
agricultural industry, while Boston, one of the area’s main towns, is home to the highest 
concentration of EU migrants after London (Chakelian, 2016). According to the Migration 
Observatory (2013) the East Midlands has a smaller than average proportion of migrants, but has 
experienced a 77 per cent increase since 2001. Boston has seen a 467 per cent increase in its 
migrant population in a decade – the largest increase in England and Wales. 2.4 per cent of 
England’s EU population originates  from countries acceded to the UK between 2001-2011. 10.6 
per cent of Boston’s population of 65,000 come from one of the ‘new’ EU countries such as 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania (Policy Exchange, 2016). Boston has been identified as 
one of the most segregated places in the UK and contains neighbourhoods of significant 
deprivation (Lincolnshire Research Observatory, 2015). 
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The focus on white migrants in this semi-rural setting offers an original perspective in the field 
of hate crime studies addressing: the scarcity of studies on ‘hidden’ groups such as white ethnic 
minorities; experiences of racism in a non-urban setting; and the impact of Brexit on experiences 
of hate crime. Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining hate crime which has been described 
as a ‘conceptual quagmire’ (Chakraborti, 2016; Wickes et al. 2016), we view hate crime as 
involving prejudice associated with a victim’s ‘minority status’ (or perceived status) i.e. race, 
ethnicity, sexuality, colour, religion, gender and disability. Racist hate crime can be explained by 
a perspective which Perry (2001)  calls ‘doing difference’. This involves the institutionalisation 
of difference via unequal relations in employment where there can be race discrimination, and 
also in the cultural sphere where for instance the media may depict minority ethnic groups as the 
‘criminal other’ (Wolhuter et al., 2008). 
 
The article begins with an overview of literature on hate crime including definitional problems in 
relation to its ‘ordinariness’ and the need for differentiation between victim groups. We then 
consider studies of race and racism in non-urban contexts, and highlight critiques of the concept 
of ‘othering’, including how its binary nature sets up a frame of reference which fails to 
acknowledge a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994), and which denies agency to victims (Bhatt, 2006). 
We then discuss the (re)production of raciaised subjects in the context of Brexit. After outlining 
methods, we discuss findings which include: migrants’ experiences of hate crime; the impact of 
hate crime including victims’ withdrawal from public life; the impact of Brexit on migrant 
identities; and instances of resistance in the form of ‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 
2011). 
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Hate crime 
The UK hate crime policy framework as set out by the College of Policing (NPCC, 2004) makes 
reference not only to hate but to ‘prejudice and hostility’. It requires police forces to record all 
hate incidents, defined or perceived by a victim or bystander as motivated by prejudice or 
hostility, even if they do not qualify for classification as a ‘notifiable offence’. Although the 
protected characteristics that give rise to a hate crime are specified as race, sexual orientation, 
transgender status, faith and disability, agencies can extend their local policy responses to 
include other forms of targeted hostility (Chakraborti, 2015). However, Wickes et al.’s (2016) 
‘conceptual quagmire’ means hate crime ‘remains a contentious term, with its conceptual, moral, 
and legal basis continuing to be a perennial source of conjecture’ (Chakraborti, 2016: 578). 
Chakraborti (2016) draws attention to a disconnect between victims’ lack of awareness of 
available services to support them and service providers’ lack of familiarity with victims and 
their problems, resulting in low levels of confidence in officialdom and of reporting, and 
implications for the continuing marginalization of victims. 
 
Scholars call for greater differentiation both between and within victim groups. On the one hand, 
we might wish to include homeless people, overseas students, those with mental health, drug or 
alcohol issues, and members of subcultures; on the other, communities consisting of migrants 
could be divided along temporal lines, between political (older diaspora) migrants and newer 
economic migrants (Garapich, 2007). Chakraborti and Garland (2012) propose a vulnerability 
approach which focuses on the context-dependent nature of what constitutes hate crime and how 
various actors come to be defined. Perry (2001) has been influential in shifting the focus from 
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the individual psychopathy of offenders to societal conditions and the operation of power. Here, 
racially motivated violence is seen as an extreme response to ‘the other who is out of control, 
who has overstepped his or her social or political boundaries, thereby challenging the entrenched 
hierarchies’ (Mason, 2009: 86). 
 
Studies have highlighted the ‘ordinariness’ of hate crime in terms of its banality, incorporating 
everyday kinds of incidents. In Kielinger and Paterson’s (2002) study the majority of reported 
hate incidents were perpetrated by people who victims had come into contact with in their daily 
lives. Chakraborti and Garland (2012: 503) highlight banal motivations as including: a departure 
from standard norms of behaviour through an inability to control language or behaviour in 
moments of stress, anger, or inebriation; or from a sense of weakness or inadequacy that can 
stem from a range of subconscious emotional and psychological processes. 
 
Hate crime and racism in non-urban contexts 
It is only recently that scholars have turned their attention to experiences of hate crime and 
racism in non-urban contexts (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004; Cloke, 2004; Hubbard, 2005) and 
to the study of ‘hidden’ ethnic minority communities such as Muslim groups, white minority 
ethnic groups and rural ethnic households. Garland and Chakraborti (2006) note that studies of 
victimization have tended to focus on the urban setting and ignore experiences of rural racism. In 
their studies of rural racism in various English counties they highlight a lack of familiarity with 
difference among many white inhabitants. This resulted in the ‘marginalization of newcomers 
from mainstream village activities, and especially those from minority ethnic backgrounds who 
are subjected to a process of “othering” from many white villagers’ (p. 51). The racist hostility 
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that results include verbal abuse and physical attacks that constitute a pattern of victimisation. 
They also caution that ‘it is unwise to make generalistic assumptions about the “minority ethnic 
experience” in the countryside as this can be multi-faceted and contingent upon social, spatial 
and temporal elements’ (ibid: 58).  
 
In his study of opposition to asylum centres in the English countryside, Hubbard (2004) notes 
that notions of the English countryside play a key role in the definition and consolidation of 
national values. He argues that ‘the community opposition expressed towards … asylum centres 
was underpinned by a (white) rural imaginary that mapped deviance onto asylum seekers…’ 
(ibid: 4). The dominant representations of the English landscape leave no room for ethnic 
‘otherness’ (Hubbard, 2004). In addition, popular constructions of rural England which focus on 
images of ‘idyllic, problem-free environments’ and ‘romanticised rurality’ have ‘masked the 
process of “othering” that works to marginalize particular groups in rural society’ (Chakraborti 
and Garland, 2004: 383). 
 
The ‘othering’ of migrants 
The concept of ‘othering’ attempts to capture the practices and processes through which the 
‘outsider’ is produced. As Bauman notes: 
 
In dichotomies crucial for the practice and vision of social order the differentiating power 
hides as a rule behind one of the members of the opposition. The second member is but 
the other of the first, the opposite (degraded, suppressed, exiled) side of the first and its 
creation. Thus abnormality is the other of the norm... woman the other of man, stranger 
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the other of the native, enemy the other of friend, ‘them’ the other of ‘us’. (1991: 14) 
 
However, the concept has been criticised for denying victim agency (Bhatt, 2006). Its binary 
nature also sets up a frame of reference which fails to see an in between or ‘third space’ and 
which, in the context of the differentiation referred to earlier in relation to people, temporalities, 
geographical locations and social spaces, denies active agency to a supposedly unified ‘voiceless 
subaltern’ (ibid: 101). In the Location of Cutlure, Bhabha’s (1994; see also Soja, 1996) theory of 
cultural difference provides us with the conceptual vocabulary of ‘hybridity’ and the ‘third 
space’. He develops Turner’s concept of liminality to propose the concept of third space as a 
position from which new identities/potentialities emerge. ‘Third space’ is criticial of essentialist 
positions of identity and of ‘originary culture’ (Bhabra, 1994). Third space contains new 
possibilities. It is a space in which cultural meaning and representation have no ‘primordial unity 
or fixity’ (Bhabha, 1994). 
 
Jensen (2011) addresses critiques of ‘othering’ with reference to McLaren’s (1994) situated 
‘oppositional agency’. McLaren similarly opposes essentialist categories: ‘difference is always a 
product of history, culture, power, and ideology. Differences occur between and among groups 
and must be understood in terms of the specificity of their production.’ (1994: 126). In his study 
of young ethnic minority men in Denmark, Jensen restores agency to the ‘othered’ through 
strategies that he terms ‘capitalization’ (appropriating elements of othering discourses in an 
attempt to imbue the category with symbolic value) and ‘refusal’ (articulating distance from the 
category by ‘talking back’ to the othering gaze). Jensen’s interviewees attempted to carve out a 
third space which was ‘not defined by firstness and otherness, but transcends the dichotomy: 
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simply as a normal human being - not Danish, but also not different from the Danish’ (2011: 74).  
 
Building on Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1918-20) pioneering work, Temple (2010) shows how 
immigrants occupy a ‘third space’ as part of ‘social becoming’. In her study, Polish migrants had 
different orientations towards: the learning and speaking of English; the values they perceived to 
be characteristic of Polish and ‘English’ culture; readings of class and access to different sections 
of society; and how integrated what they wanted to become in a context of uncertainty about 
their length of stay. This differentiation is echoed in Ryan’s (2017) notion of levels of 
‘embeddedness’ in four sectors of household, workplace, neighbourhood and wider community.   
 
Finally, studies show how migrants actively differentiate themselves through discourses of 
personal responsibility. In Cederberg’s (2014) study, a responsibility to learn and speak the 
‘host’ country’s language and to resist becoming ‘segregated’ by ‘excluding oneself’ is invoked 
as part of the presentation of a ‘responsible citizen’ identity – a consciously ‘managed’ self that 
can be distinguished from other less ‘well-behaved’ immigrants. ‘Boundary work’ is engaged in 
by migrants to draw distinctions between ‘poor subaltern’ immigrants and themselves as ‘mobile 
professionals’ (Bygnes, 2015). 
 
Brexit and the (re)production of racialized subjects 
McDonald and Erez (2007) suggest that being a person in a foreign land carries with it a special 
set of vulnerabilities and disadvantages that add to and interact with other social statuses which 
people occupy. Even individuals who are relatively privileged in terms of education and other 
resources are ‘forced to the back of the social line when they become foreigners’ (p. 6). Fox et al. 
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(2012) show how immigration policy and tabloid journalism interact to reproduce ‘racialized’ 
subjects in relation to Eastern European migrants (Hungarians and Romanians) in the UK. They 
argue that while immigration policy includes subjects on the basis of shared whiteness, tabloid 
newspapers tend toward a cultural racism that is exclusionary on the basis of putative cultural 
differences. Racialization occurs when the category of ‘race’ is invoked in discursive and 
institutional practices to interpret, order and structure social relations. ‘Race’ in this sense is not 
an essential trait of migrants, but rather the socially constructed outcome of processes and 
practices of exclusion. Racialization does not require putative phenotypical or biological 
difference but can make use of (and/or construct) cultural traits as a basis of differentiation. Their 
case demonstrates that the nominal absence of somatic difference does not get in the way of 
xenophobic racism. Rather, racialized difference can be invented in situ. 
 
Whiteness is not only a subtle determinant of immigration policy but also the contingent 
outcome of policy, practices, and processes that operate according to other logics. Tabloid media 
framings using metaphors of floods, deluges, inundations, swamps, streams, hordes and 
invasions ‘are not openly or crudely racist; rather they hint at and simultaneously validate taken-
for-granted assumptions about the relationship between immigration and race accrued from the 
past’ (ibid: 687). Regardless of their actual race/ethnicity, culturally-established stigma is 
transferred from one group to another. This cultural racism occurs when ‘essentialized cultural 
and social characteristics … are indiscriminately imputed to people identified with ethno-
national labels’ (ibid: 690). In the policy process, Eastern Europeans are desirable because they 
conform to racialized understandings of ‘Europeanness’ while in the tabloids it is not shared 
whiteness operating as a basis of inclusion, but cultural difference operating as a criterion for 
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exclusion. 
 
In relation to the EU Brexit vote, Virdee and McGeever (2017) argue that the history of 
immigration to Britain has been so racialized over time that a reservoir of latent racism was 
activated in the referendum campaigning through the production of appropriately coded 
language. Messages ranged from immigrants ‘sponging’ off the welfare state and ‘bleeding’ the 
National Health Service dry, to being involved in criminality (Berry, 2016). Immigration 
overtook economic issues towards the end of the referendum campaign (Deacon et al., 2016). 
More than 6,000 racist hate crimes were reported to the National Police Chiefs Council in the 
four weeks after the result was declared (NPCC, 2016). Perpetrators made little attempt to 
distinguish between black and brown citizens and white European migrants: ‘In their eyes, they 
were all outsiders’ (Virdee and McGeever, 2017: 7). 
 
Our study of the experiences of white Eastern European migrants in the post-Brexit climate, with 
its focus on the semi-rural setting of Lincolnshire and the ‘hidden’ experiences of victimization 
of this particular white ethnic group, presents an important and timely analysis which adds an 
original perspective to the field of hate crime studies and studies of migration, ‘othering’ and 
racism in non-urban contexts.  
 
Methods 
The discussion draws on data collected from semi-structured interviews with Eastern European 
migrants in Lincolnshire and observations at community meetings. Access was provided by 
Lincolnshire Police. Purposive sampling, followed by snowball sampling, was initially effective. 
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The sample was extended via contact with additional community groups and organisations (e.g. 
victim support services). The final sample consisted of 11 interviewees (eight women and three 
men, ranging in age from 20 to 50). They had come to the UK from Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine and most had been in the UK for 12 years, often working in 
other parts of the country before settling in Lincoln or Boston for work or to establish a family. 
The observations (over 2 days) were conducted by the Research Assistant and included informal 
conversations with migrants at local community group meetings, access to which was initially 
provided by Lincolnshire Police. The specific details of the events attended are not discussed for 
reasons of confidentiality. 
 
Participants initially claimed not to have experienced what they understood as hate crime, despite 
refering to experiences that qualified in law. It became clear that his was because in many cases 
their experiences of hate crime (including most prominently verbal abuse) had become routinized 
and normalised within everyday life and community interactions. We therefore tailored our 
interview schedule accordingly to explore community relations and sentiments around 
immigration and Brexit more broadly. Throughout the study we adopted an inductive approach, 
being guided by the emergence of key themes in interviews including any we had not initially 
considered. Analysis followed a thematic approach, a key aspect of which is flexibility (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). We followed Braun and Clarke’s six stages of analysis which include: 
familiarising yourself with the data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing 
themes; defining and naming themes; and producing the report. The analysis was first conducted 
individually by each of the authors, and then identified themes were reviewed, compared and 
discussed. As researchers we were all active in identifying themes, selecting those of interest, 
 12 
and disemminating them to various audiences. The study received university ethics approval. 
Participants’ identities were anonymized by assigning participant numbers. 
 
We recognise that recruiting through community organisations is likely to result in a degree of 
self selection of those who feel they have something to say. However, in a project the aim of 
which is to explore perspectives on and experiences of an under-reported crime, this may be seen 
as a strength rather than a disadvantage. It requires a broader approach and an awareness of any 
apparent agenda interviewees may have. Designing our interview schedule to explore community 
relations and sentiments around immigration and Brexit more broadly, was effecive as a ‘way in’ 
rather than directly asking about experiences of hate crime to solicit accounts of the kinds of 
hate-related ‘incidents’ which qualify as ‘crimes’ according to the legislation. This also enabled 
us, when undertaking thematic analysis of the data, not only to include the kinds of ‘incidents’ 
described, but to categorise and contextualise them. While our findings rest on a small number of 
interviewees, the observations we conducted in our meetings with police and community groups 
in the setting up of the project, during the observations, and in the presentation of findings to 
stakeholders, mean that we are reflecting a range of experiences and responses to hate crime 
from (white Eastern European) victims in the period following the ‘Brexit’ vote, which serve to 
illuminate the parameters of a hidden and under-reported phenomenon. 
 
Findings 
1. Experiences of hate crime: banal and everyday 
Given the ‘hidden’ nature of the experiences of groups such as white eastern European migrants, 
it is important initially to highlight the everyday and banal nature of hate crime in this semi-rural 
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context – to surface experiences such as verbal abuse, physical and symbolic violence, and 
exploitation from employers. 
 
Within the broader definition of hate crime which we adopted, the most common experiences our 
interviewees related were of verbal abuse. Being sworn at typically consisted of being called 
‘Fucking foreigners’ (e.g. when chatting to a friend in a night club queue) and told to ‘Fuck off’ 
(interviewee 3, Hungarian, female, in UK since 2002). Interviewee 1 (Polish, in UK since 2005) 
told us that 12 years earlier when she first arrived, people were more interested than antagonistic 
but that had changed, first with the recession in 2008, when comments like ‘Pack your bags and 
go home’ or ‘What you still doing here?’ were heard, and then again following the Brexit vote, 
so that now, ‘You won’t go a week without hearing something’. Others observed that people 
found it much easier to be hostile and abusive online: ‘I had a few incidents on social media 
where someone said to me that all of us should be deported, should go back to where we came 
from’ (interviewee 5, Polish, female, in UK since 2004). 
 
Those who had only experienced verbal abuse knew of others who had experienced physical 
violence: 
 
A lot of the guys like to go fishing… one of the gentlemen went to do some fishing and 
was approached by a family… after they hear his accent they started to say nasty things 
… and throwed stones at him … one of the stones hit his head so he was bleeding. 
(Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) 
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Incidents also occurred in the workplace. A taxi driver, for example, explained how he regularly 
encountered xenophobia when listening to passengers swearing at ‘foreigners’ before they 
realised that he was one of them. On the day of the referendum vote someone left a note on his 
car windscreen which read: ‘Have you packed your bags yet’? After the Brexit vote, he 
recounted:  
 
People were acting like they’ve had unloaded gun in their pockets – they knew they can 
make us feel unpleasant … it was unloaded but it was shown to us… so it was that 
unwritten and unsaid situation that was making me … careful if you know what I mean. 
(Interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 2004/5) 
 
Others experienced exploitation from employers (e.g. having around £80 a week to cover 
expenses deducted without prior notification, or being hired as an au pair to care for one child 
when there were three). Such treatment came as a shock since, as one of our interviewees pointed 
out:  
 
Before we even joined the EU we had agencies from the UK coming to Poland recruiting 
people… we had meetings for up to 200 people who were interested in working in UK … 
with potential employers… and they were saying… what we will get, they would sort out 
for everyone accommodation, work, everything needed…many health care companies, 
factories, agricultural companies… (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) 
 
Interviewee 3 (Hungarian, in UK since 2002) worked in a clothes shop where she was not only 
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excluded by colleagues but had been assaulted by her supervisor who was ‘against foreign 
nationals’. He called her a ‘dipshit’ in front of a customer, told her to, ‘Fuck off back to your 
own country’ and threw a bunch of keys at her, leaving a mark near her eye for days afterwards. 
The assistant manager who witnessed him verbally abusing her said, ‘Oh boy, you must have 
pissed him off if he talks to you like that’. 
 
2. The impact of hate crime: withdrawal from public life 
The ways in which these migrants managed the perceived threat to their safety by withdrawing 
from public life and spaces had the effect of rendering them both invisible and silenced. 
Participants spoke of places where they had learned not to ‘open one’s mouth’ – not only in 
‘rough’ neighbourhoods where one would feel unsafe as a ‘foreigner’, but in town, at the pub or 
in a taxi: 
 
Some of my friends, they’re engineers, they got PhDs and they don’t go out to town and 
they don’t speak our language. They speak English because they feel uncomfortable… 
people will start asking ‘Oh, where you from?’…When you go to the pub now, you don’t 
tend to speak. (Interviewee 6, Polish, female, in UK since 2007) 
 
One participant explained how her friend’s young son refused to speak to her on the phone on his 
way home:  
 
His mum called him and he just texted her saying ‘I can’t speak to you now; I’ll call 
when I get back home’. When he got home he said to her that the taxi driver made such a 
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horrific comment that he was scared to speak to his mum in Polish. (Interviewee 1, 
Polish, in UK since 2005) 
 
Others known to our participants led an extremely circumscribed life, avoiding certain public or 
community spaces, and this was amplified in the wake of Brexit:  
 
[They] won’t leave the house unless they go shopping to Tesco or Wilkinson or 
Poundland…never been in coffee shop… been in the UK for eight years but never went 
to coffee shop…because they don’t feel confident or because they try before and 
something bad happened. (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) 
 
There was a parallel process of feeling obliged to be ‘accountable’ for one’s nationality, as 
illustrated by one interviewee’s experience at a community meeting when a representative of a 
church organisation asked where she was from. When she said she was from Poland, he said ‘I’m 
not asking your country, I’m asking the city or the organisation’. She went on: ‘And I’m like, 
“Sorry, I just got used to so many people asking where I’m from that automatically I’m saying 
Poland”’ (Interviewee 1, in UK since 2005). 
 
A woman from the Czech Republic (interviewee 2, in UK since 2006) recounted how 11 years 
ago when she came for a finite period to improve her English, she had ended up working with a 
mixture of Portuguese, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles, consequently learning more Russian and 
Polish than English. Returning in 2005 to Lincolnshire, she communicated comfortably with the 
large Polish community she found but gradually began to acquire what she saw as the British 
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sensibility of politeness. Now she gets annoyed when observing what she sees as rudeness, for 
example towards shopkeepers and service staff, on the part of the new wave of migrants from 
Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, having moved on from the comfort and security of her early 
exclusive associations with those (Slavic, Russian and Polish) people who shared cultural traits 
and festivals, to tending to ‘cling more to the English people’, she thinks that ‘the immigration in 
this town is too much now’. This is less an issue of ‘mass immigration’ per se, she suggests, but 
more to do with the strain on public services from increased demand from people who do not 
speak English, as well as pressure on housing. The ambivalences of the processes of 
identification are revealed as she relates the last incident she experienced: 
 
So that he becomes bilingual, she speaks to her young son in her own language. However, when 
another child of 12 years of age overheard them talking in a public park, insults followed, with 
the child calling them both ‘fucking foreigners’. She shouted that she was going to call the police 
because it was racist and an English woman who observed the incident urged her to do so. 
However she regarded it as inappropriate since she attributed responsibility to the child’s family. 
She speaks as a societal ‘insider’ when she adds that it hurt more coming from a child because, 
‘it makes you wonder what society is coming to’. She goes on to invoke the trait of politeness: 
she avoids speaking in Czech is in ‘mixed’ company in order to be ‘considerate’. She knows 
what it feels like to be in a group of foreign-language speakers and thinks it is ‘rude’ if all those 
present can speak English but choose not to.  
 
3. The impact of Brexit on migrant identities 
In a similar vein, a Hungarian whose friends, after 11 years in the UK, are ‘99 percent British’ 
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regards herself as ‘a British person with an eastern European accent’. Comfortable with this until 
the Brexit vote, she now feels forced to reflect on official citizenship and moving again: 
 
We all know about Theresa May’s propositions and it makes my future quite unsteady … 
I will not be thrown out of the country because I’m an immigrant … if I would have to 
move out of the UK I would move to Scotland … But I am a bit concerned and that’s 
why I’m trying to mitigate it. (Interviewee 3, Hungarian, in UK since 2002) 
 
A Polish interviewee with a long-term partner, house and job also speaks as a member of British 
society but her sense of identity has been ‘knocked’ by post-referendum events: 
 
It’s really upsetting … looking at the United Kingdom. We supposed to be focused on … 
society, human rights … freedom of speech, movement, any freedom ... But recently … 
makes you feel like, is it really worth coming, trying to integrate, learn the language, 
educating yourself, working hard, if all you get is negative comments and abuse? 
(Interviewee 1, Polish, in UK since 2005) 
 
For others, the impact was in terms of an explicit dis-identification performed through boundary 
work (Cederberg, 2014). The taxi driver is at pains to differentiate himself from migrants who 
attract public opprobrium: ‘I would say myself that I’m not happy about some people being here. 
Because it makes yourself ashamed … I’m passing by all these benches and areas where people 
are sitting and all what they do, just sitting and drinking’. Nine out of ten of these people ‘would 
be from exactly the same community back in (their own) country… that’s a different-type level 
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of people’, he adds. However, his experiences of hate crime are compensated for by the 
messages of support received from other British people (interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 
2004/5). 
 
Participants were positioned within the ‘in between’ space described by Temple (2010) – a space 
which is not static or stable but subject to shifts according to events and influences beyond one’s 
control. A major influence compounding this insecurity was media discourse (Fox et al., 2012). 
A Polish interviewee observes the way that both the local city and county newspapers provided 
‘a space for people to actually be racist, say racist things without anything happening’. One had 
published several articles since Brexit, focused on migrant workers and how much pressure 
migration puts on education and the NHS: ‘And I’m thinking “Why? Why do you do it?” It’s not 
really true what they say.’ Such reports do not go unnoticed by ‘native’ language media: 
 
If you’ve got access to media from your own country, whether it’s Poland or Lithuania or 
Latvia you get the message that people are not wanted in UK. (Interviewee 1, in UK since 
2005) 
 
She had to reassure her elderly father in Poland of her safety after he read a report of a racist 
attack on a man in her locality who later died. A reference she made to family ‘left behind’ 
highlights another element inherent in occupying a third space – the experience of loss. This was 
referred to by several interviewees. A Czech woman explained that the recent spike in hate crime 
had heightened her sense of loss:  
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I don’t feel welcome here after Brexit ... And I see the beauty of my country and every 
time I just come back from that crying – I want to go home. (Interviewee 2, in UK since 
2006) 
 
The taxi driver, a self-described ‘romantic’, found Boston unattractive after having lived near 
‘lovely little villages like Mevagissey’. But he was no stranger to loss: ‘You just start missing 
what you had, especially back home’, where he had ‘a few hectares of land and forest and fruit 
garden and two lakes and dogs and horses’. He believed that some people do not realise how 
much migrants have sacrificed by moving to the UK: 
 
It’s not like we following American dream, going, ‘Yeah, going to be famous, I’m going 
to live in California, have a swimming pool and 20 bedrooms and 60 dogs … you 
sacrifice your life, earn so much as you earn and save just to go once a year to see your 
family. (Interviewee 4, Polish, in UK since 2004/5) 
 
4. Resistance: ‘talking back’ 
There was evidence of resistance to the negative impacts of victimisation which took the form of 
‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 2011). This happened: by refuting banal ‘othering’ 
discourses; by taking direct action; and by criticising government positions and responses. 
 
A number of alternative discourses to those constituting ‘othering’ were offered. In place of 
accusations about migrants ‘taking our jobs’ from those seen as unwilling to ‘go and work on the 
fields or in chicken factory for £7.20 per hour, 12-hour shift’, were representations of migrants as 
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tax-payers. Interviewees highlighted the inconsistency and hypocrisy inherent in the fact that 
British people with businesses in Spain and Italy are rarely enjoined to ‘pack their bags and 
leave’. In place of blame for demand on educational resources from migrant children with poor 
English, were claims that they learn the language very quickly, not least because of being 
bequeathed values about education as the route to a ‘better life’. In place of negative portrayals 
of all ‘foreigners’ as drunken rough-sleepers, were strategies designed to ‘disaggregate’ the 
‘other’ and lay claims to ‘normality’:  
 
… there is nothing normal people can do about it. What are you supposed to do? Go on 
the street and take beer off drunks or drugs from druggies? I shouldn’t be punished for 
someone else’s behaviour … (Interviewee 5, Polish, female, in UK since 2004) 
 
This same participant tackled someone on Facebook who had referred to some ‘foreign idiots’ 
jumping out in front of a car. She counteracted what she saw as xenophobia by replying, ‘I think 
they are idiots because they are idiots not because they are foreign’, adding that such comments 
only serve to make relations in Boston worse than they already are. Her riposte resulted in an 
‘avalanche’ of abuse, including criticism of migrants who are not able to speak English. 
 
Another context emboldening interviewees to take action was when it involved another. Having 
encouraged a fellow Polish person to report a crime despite perceptions that the police typically 
take no action, interviewee 5 became assertive in her demand that someone at the police station 
take a report from them. When the police were reluctant to do so she threatened to go to the press 
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‘and create an article about the Boston police not co-operating with foreign nationals and 
ignoring me because I’m foreign’. ‘And straightaway everything sorted’, she said. 
 
Such action was exceptional however and cultural factors associated with styles of policing and 
perceived issues of national identity were cited as accounting for a reluctance to contact the 
police. There was a lack of faith that any action would be taken by the police arising on the one 
hand from a tendency to ‘solve things between ourselves’ rather than be a snitch; and on the 
other, to the contrast between UK police who liked to look for causes and explanations and 
police in Poland, who wear guns and ‘get things done’ by being ‘vocal’ or even violent. A lack 
of faith in the UK police was also compounded by their historical neglect of the issues faced by 
migrant communities. 
 
Pride was identified as a factor prohibiting reporting, especially for men: ‘another thing is the 
pride… for males… you’re the head of the house so you should be able to cope with things like 
this’ (interviewee 7, Crimea, female, in UK since 2005). But it also operated for women, one of 
whom had urged her friend to report an incident but acknowledged that she herself had not 
reported the abuse she received in shops and online:  
 
… I don’t want them to see me suffering. Because then they know that they can hurt me 
and if they can hurt me, ‘Oh yeah, get in, give more’…And we quite proud nation. 
(Interviewee 5, Polish, in UK since 2004) 
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There was also ‘talking back’ to the government. It was seen as a failure of the government not 
only to have created a generation who have never worked, but to have fuelled a discourse of 
scapegoating migrants:  
 
Anything what is going wrong now in UK, whether it’s economy or some sort of politics, 
the blame goes to migrant workers… we came here, we work, we pay taxes, but it’s our 
fault. (Interviewee 1, Polish, female, in UK since 2005) 
 
This interviewee also sees the EU negotiations as a reprehensible way for a country like the UK 
to treat its citizens: ‘You just don’t … [say] things like: “You need to wait because we want to 
get what we want and then we will decide what to do with you”’. Such government-induced 
insecurity not only represents the breaking of a social contract, but is experienced as a huge 
betrayal. This led not only to fragmentation between UK and foreign nationals, with increasing 
hostility accompanying each new wave of immigration, but to intra-group fragmentation arising 
from a historical mistrust between Polish people and Lithuanians which was amplified post-
Brexit vote. The sophisticated analysis employed in these accounts of resistance from a relatively 
highly-educated sample of migrants and the passion accompanying the examples they gave of 
‘speaking back’ highlights the emotional and embodied components of resistance. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper offers an original addition to the field of hate crime studies by presenting the accounts 
and experiences of white eastern European migrants in Lincolnshire, England. It addresses the 
tendency in hate crime studies to ‘overlook’ particular minority groups of ‘hidden’ people such 
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as white eastern European migrants with ‘hidden experiences of vicitmisation’ (Chakraborti, 
Garland and Spalek, 2004: 34). It focuses on their experences within a semi-rural context thus 
also shedding light onto experiences of hate crime and racism in non-urban contexts and spaces. 
These migrants experienced hostility from the community in a routinized and normalized manner 
highlighting the everyday, ordinary and banal nature of much hate crime (Chakraborti and 
Garland, 2012). The majority of hate crime incidents experienced by these migrants were verbal 
(i.e. ‘pack your bags’ and ‘fucking foreigners’) or symbolic (i.e. a note left on the taxi driver’s 
car windscreen), but there were also accounts of physical abuse. This was exacerbated by Brexit 
which participants believed had further legitimized pre-existing community sentiments that 
migrants were ‘a drain on local resources’. The findings mirror those of studies of racism in rural 
settngs whereby community opposition can be underpinned by a (white) imaginary and the 
mapping of deviance and outsider status onto migrant groups (Hubbard, 2004). 
 
Since our interviewees had been living in the UK for over 10 years, their accounts also 
uncovered the dynamic nature of the experience of hate crime and some of the ways in which 
personal experiences of the phenomenon articulate with wider structural, economic and political 
events. Temporal factors are significant for differentiating the category ‘migrants’ in relation to: 
when they migrated; how long they have been undergoing processes of identification in a new 
country; and historical ‘events’ such as recession, the EU Referendum and ‘Brexit’ - events 
which serve to (re)activate latent hostilities which, when mobilised, disrupt integration both by 
and within (heterogeneous) migrant ‘communities’. This demonstrates that it is important not to 
make generalistic assumptions about the ‘minority ethnic experience’ which can be ‘multi-
faceted and contingent upon social, spatial and temporal elements’ (Garland and Chakraborti, 
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2006: 58). 
 
Their accounts revealed the significance of place and space (‘there’, ‘here’, ‘home’ ‘in 
between’). Many of our participants had lived and worked elsewhere before settling in 
Lincoln(shire) and several commented on being struck, on arrival, by the lack of diversity in the 
area. They shared with many UK graduates a dissonance between educational level and 
employment opportunities available to them but their experience of hate crime was peculiar to 
them. They were also ‘out of place’ in the areas in which they resided, at least in relation to their 
British neighbours there. 
 
As a consequence of the hate crime they experienced, they and others they knew found 
themselves ‘managing’/disciplining the self in a Foucauldian sense by occupying the ‘privatised’ 
space of taking personal responsibility for their own victimisation (reinforced on occasion by 
official responses). They also withdrew physically from the community and from public spaces. 
This included being hypervigilant in certain neighbourhoods, on public transport, and when 
participating in the night-time economy, and not drawing attention to their ‘foreign language’ or 
‘accent’. Some migrants retreated into the private space of their own homes, as the only place 
they could speak freely without fear of experiencing abuse. 
 
Their accounts were also notable for the way they surfaced feelings: ‘You feel like you are the 
guilty one’, ‘(friends) feel uncomfortable’, ‘he was scared’, ‘they no longer feel confident’. We 
are (re)inserting (victims’) feelings into the picture (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). We are also 
extending the analysis by illuminating the interaction between the two sides’ feelings. If we see 
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perpetrators’ fears as not only projected onto but ‘taken up by’ victims in their 
individualised/privatised responses, we can identify a dynamic which, once it becomes 
‘normalised’ in the way our interviewees described, establishes ‘structures of feeling’. These are 
structures through which people become ‘inmates’ of their own homes (Funnell, 2015) and 
through which a politics of fear is perpetuated. As Thompson and Hoggett observe: ‘The 
patterning of love and hate in conflict situations … provides a glimpse of the way in which 
feelings contribute to the dynamic ordering of public life’ (2012: 8). 
 
There was a suggestion that for those able to do so, a move out of the ‘epicentre’ of the post-
Brexit-referendum ‘spike’ in hate crime to a different neighbourhood or to a rural environment, 
was a move towards closer alignment with their British ‘peers’ – from whom some received 
much-valued support. There is evidence of Ryan’s (2017) ‘differentiated embedding’ across 
household, workplace, neighbourhood and wider community. But to reiterate, in each domain, 
the trajectory and patterning of the embedding process was to a significant degree determined by 
an individualised response from victims themselves rather than by legal or institutional 
responses. 
 
The public spaces of social and print media and policy discourse was also experienced as hostile 
and complicit in both the perpetration of hate crime and the necessity for victims to manage it. 
For instance, this was reflected in instances when they had to reassure elderly family members 
who were fearful for their migrant sons and daughters after reading media reports of hate crime 
in UK. ‘Home’ as place also figures powerfully in migrants’ experience of loss: of a former 
‘beautiful’ home only now accessible via occasional holiday visits or in memory and 
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imagination. No longer having relational ties with one’s country/culture of origin was identified 
as significant in the transition to a partial UK national identity, for example as ‘British with a 
foreign accent’.  
 
These movements back and forth in time and space reveal an unsteady foothold in a ‘third space’ 
(Bhabra, 1994) rendered even more unstable by wider events and influences. It is an 
‘unsteadiness’ constituted by an alignment between: the ubiquitous insecurity within the labour 
market for the neoliberal worker-subject which these migrants largely espoused in their efforts to 
construct a self-reliant entrepreneurial self (amplified by the exploitation of dishonest and 
deceptive employers); and being victims of hate crime. It was an unsteadiness further 
compounded by the ongoing uncertainty, post-Brexit, of their status as UK residents. 
 
This ‘in between’ status nevertheless leaves space for (constrained) forms of agency and we saw 
our interviewees exerting this in a number of ways, collectively portrayed here as resistance and 
‘talking back to the othering gaze’ (Jensen, 2011). In addition to performing the kind of 
boundary work that portrayed them as distinct from those migrants to be found drunk on public 
benches, we saw them offering alternative narratives to those circulated by hate crime 
perpetrators and media outlets, in relation to work, education, health and housing. We heard 
them criticising and challenging state responses. Finally, some were taking direct action - on 
social media, in face-to-face public interactions and in interactions with officialdom. In the light 
of their accounts, we characterise these passionate and deeply-felt resistant responses as a 
rejection of a victim identity and as a staging post en route to the emergence of a political subject 
– one which evidences the operation of agency within processes of othering of these migrants, 
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graphically illustrated by one interviewee’s assertion that she ‘will not be thrown out of the 
country because I’m an immigrant’. 
 
We acknowledge that this study focuses on the experiences of a small sample of migrants and 
therefore call for future research in hate crime studies to explore in more depth (and via 
comparative studies) the experiences of ‘hidden’ migrant groups in semi-rural and rural contexts. 
Greater discussion of the ‘conceptual quagmire’ (Chakraborti, 2016) around hate crime, 
experiences of and responses to it in non-urban contexts, and by various overlooked ethnic 
minority groups such as white eastern European migrants, is vital as we seek to map and evaluate 
the effects of the EU (Brexit) referendum. 
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